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Notes
PHYSICIANS--STATUTE RELIEVING PHYSICIANS, SURGEONS
AND NURSES FROM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR E mlmFlNCY MEDICAL

CARE-Neb. Laws c. 110, p. 349 (1961).
I.

Jane Doe is injured in an automobile accident, and is negligently treated by a physician who is the first person to reach the
scene. As a result of the physician's negligence, Jane's injuries
fail to heal properly and she files a malpractice suit against the

doctor.
Prior to the 1961 Session of the Nebraska Legislature the outcome of Jane's suit would have depended upon the common-law
rules applicable to such cases. This the legislature has attempted
to change by its enactment of the following statute: 1
[N] o person [physician, surgeon or nurse licensed under Nebraska

law] ...who renders emergency care at the scene of an emergency
gratuitously and in good faith, shall be held liable for any civil
damages as a result of any act or omission by such person in rendering the emergency care or as a result of any act or failure to act
to provide or arrange for further medical treatment or care for the
injured person.
In view of this statute the very existence of Jane's cause of
action is in doubt.
II.
Can the state legislature, in one short paragraph, so simply
and decisively sweep away a common-law right? Perhaps not.
The Nebraska Constitution, Article I, section 13 states: "All courts
shall be open, and every person, for any injury done him in his
lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have a remedy by due
1 Neb. Laws c. 110, p. 348 (1961).

Similar statutes have been enacted in several other states. They
include: CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2144 (Supp. 1961); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN c. 66, § 9-A (Supp. 1961); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-17-37 (Supp.
1961); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-17-37 (Supp. 1961); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
59, § 518 (Supp. 1961); S.D. Laws c. 137, p. 155 (1961); Tex. Laws c.
317, p. 681 (1961); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-12-23 (Supp. 1961); WYo. STAT.
ANN. § 33-343.1 (Supp. 1961).

All apply to physicians and surgeons. The South Dakota and Utah
statutes extend also to osteopaths, and the California statute extends
to midwives.

The Texas and Wyoming laws apply to "all persons"

rendering aid in an emergency. All are applicable to "emergencies"
with the exception of the Maine statute, which concerns "accidents."
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2
course of law, and justice administered without denial or delay."
In Nebraska this constitutional guaranty has been held to be a
restriction on the legislature as well as on the other branches of
government.3 Under such an interpretation the general rule is
that the legislature is prohibited from abolishing a common-law
remedy for injuries to person or property. 4 It may change the
remedy or form of procedure, attach conditions precedent to its
exercise, or abolish old and substitute new remedies, but it cannot deny a remedy entirely.5
Exceptions to this rule have been made as to the abolition of
actions for alienation of affections,6 criminal conversation,7 seduction 8 and breach of contract to marry.9 Such exceptions have
2

See Fender v. Waller, 139 Neb. 612, 618, 298 N.W. 349, 352 (1941), where
the court declares: "Litigants are entitled to access to the courts of
the land when they have probable cause and reasonable basis for believing an injury has been done to their lands, goods, person or reputation."
In Wilfong v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry., 129 Neb. 600, 611, 262 N.W.
537, 542 (1935), the Nebraska court upheld the plaintiff administrator's claim for damages due to pain and suffering of the decedent. In

so doing, the court discussed the constitutional issue and concluded:
"In a broad sense the claim for personal injury recognized and created
by this constitutional provision, as applied to torts, is 'a chose in action'."
3 First Trust Co. v. Smith, 134 Neb. 84, 115, 277 N.W. 762, 777-78 (1938).
Note the comprehensive discussion of this constitutional provision, id.
at 106-15, 277 N.W. at 773-78.
4 See Taylor v. Hubbell, 188 F.2d 106 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
818 (1951); Stewart v. Houk, 127 Ore. 589, 271 Pac. 998 (1928); City of
Janesville v. Carpenter, 77 Wis. 288, 46 N.W. 128 (1890).
5 Mattson v. City of Astoria, 39 Ore. 577, 65 Pac. 1066 (1901); accord,
Gallegher v. Davis, 37 Del. 380, 183 Atl. 620 (1936) (upholding an automobile guest statute) (excellent policy discussion, id. 183 Atl. at 624);
Fellows v. Seymour, 171 Misc. 833, 13 N.Y.S.2d 803 (Sup. Ct. 1939)
(workmen's compensation substituted for common-law remedies
against employers); Vanderbilt v. Hegeman, 157 Misc. 908, 284 N.Y.
Supp. 586 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
6 Langdon v. Sayre, 74 Cal. App. 2d 41, 168 P.2d 57 (2d Dist. 1946); Pennington v. Stewart, 212 Ind. 553, 10 N.E.2d 619 (1937); Hanfgarn v.
Mark, 274 N.Y. 22, 8 N.E.2d. 47, remittitur amended, 274 N.Y. 570, 10
N.E.2d 556, appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 641 (1937). But see Wilder v.
Reno, 43 F. Supp. 727 (M.D. Pa. 1942) (dictum strongly questioning the
constitutionality of a statute abolishing actions for alienation of affections and breach of contract to marry).
7 Langdon v. Sayre, 74 Cal. App. 2d 41, 168 P.2d 57 (2d Dist. 1946);
Bunten v. Bunten, 15 N.J. Misc. 532, 192 Atl. 727 (Sup. Ct. 1937); Vanderbilt v. Hegeman, 157 Misc. 908, 284 N.Y. Supp. 586 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
8 Langdon v. Syre, 74 Cal. App. 2d 41, 168 P.2d 57 (2d Dist. 1946); Bunten
v. Bunten, 15 N.J. Misc. 532, 192 Atl. 727 (Sup Ct. 1937).
9 Thibault v. Lalumiere, 318 Mass. 72, 60 N.E.2d 349 (1945); Vanderbilt

NOTES
been justified either on the ground that they were not property
rights, 10 or that they were not "fundamental" rights" entitled to
constitutional protection. As explained by one court, these actions
and their continuance is detri"have resulted in grave abuses,
12
mental to the public interest.'
Here, however, the right of action abolished by the Nebraska
statute is clearly not within the above exceptions. There are, in
fact, no reported cases in Nebraska involving malpractice actions
arising from treatment provided in emergencies, and as a result no
evidence of abuse may be deduced or documented.
At least one court, though, has gone beyond the enumerated
exceptions in holding that common-law remedies could be abolished not only when a reasonable substitute was provided, but
also when such abolition was a reasonable exercise of the police
power. 13 The language of the Nebraska Constitution would not
appear to justify such an interpretation, but if such a rationale
were applied, the court doing so would necessarily be forced to
resolve the ensuing question of whether14 or not this statute is a
legitimate exercise of the police power.
III.

The test of police power validity is whether the statute has any
real, substantial relation to the public health.15 The apparent
purpose of such a "Good Samaritan" law as this, as shown by its
legislative history,'0 is to encourage medical personnel to render

10

11
12

13

14

15

16

v. Hegeman, 157 Misc. 908, 284 N.Y. Supp. 586 (Sup. Ct. 1935). But see
Wilder v. Reno, 43 F. Supp. 727 (M.D. Pa. 1942).
See Lebohm v. City of Galveston, 154 Tex. 192, 275 S.W.2d 951 (1955).
Vanderbilt v. Hegeman, 157 Misc. 908, 284 N.Y. Supp. 586 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
Vanderbilt v. Hegeman, 157 Misc. 908, 911, 284 N.Y. Supp. 586, 591 (Sup.
Ct. 1935); accord, Langdon v. Sayre, 74 Cal. App. 2d 41, 168 P.2d 57 (2d
Dist. 1946).
Lebohm v. City of Galveston, 154 Tex. 192, 275 S.W.2d 951 (1955)
(charter provision exempting city from liability for injuries caused by
defective streets held invalid).
This would again require a balancing by the courts of the importance
of the public benefit sought to be promoted against the seriousness of
the restriction of private right sought to be imposed. See, e.g., Richardson v. Beattie, 98 N.H. 71, 95 A.2d 122 (1953).
See Liggett Co. v. Baldrige, .278 U.S. 105 (1928); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea
Co. v. Mayor & Comm'rs, 367 Ill. 310, 11 N.E.2d 388 (1937) Lincoln
Dairy Co. v. Finigan, 170 Neb. 777, 104 N.W.2d 227 (1960) (public health
measures must have some reasonable relation to the proposed ends).
See notes 37 and 38 infra.
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aid in emergency situations. But such an obligation or responsibility may already exist. If so, the statute clearly could have no
relation to the public health since it would merely be encouraging
performance where performance is already due. This could scarcely be construed as a legitimate exercise of the police power.
The general rule, however, is that there is "no duty to answer the call of one who is dying and might be saved, nor . . . to

play the part of a good Samaritan and bind up the wounds of a
stranger who is bleeding to death."' 7 But this doctrine has already been whittled away by the "special relationship" situations,' 8 and the courts might well extend the humanitarian reasoning of such decisions to medical emergencies. A step in this direction was taken in a recent Delaware case where the Delaware Supreme Court said that a hospital may be liable for refusal of service to a patient in case of an unmistakable emergency. 19 Moral
revulsion against the general rule may eventually result in the
imposition of a legal duty on one to come to the aid of a fellow
human in peril, so long as little personal inconvenience is involved.20 Perhaps this same moral revulsion will have an immediate influence on the courts in their interpretation of this
statute.
An important consideration in determining whether there is
any justification for such a statute is the adequacy of protection
given by the common law. As to physicians treating people in
emergencies, there is much evidence that such protection is ample.
First, the requisite degree of skill which one is ordinarily required
to exercise is merely that of a reasonable man in like circumstan17 PROSSER, TORTS

184 (2d ed. 1955), citing Allen v. Hixson, 111 Ga. 460,

36 S.E. 810 (1900), and Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N. E. 1058
(1901).
As examples of the special relationship holdings, see Hutchinson v.
Dickie, 162 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1947) (owner of cabin cruiser under duty
of reasonable care to rescue guest who fell overboard); L. S. Ayres &
Co. v. Hicks, 220 Ind. 86, 40 N.E.2d 334 (1942) (department store owed
duty of reasonable care to aid an invitee injured on the premises);
Szabo v. Pennsylvania R.R., 132 N.J.L. 331, 40 A:2d 562 (Ct. Err. & App.
1945) (master must render aid to helpless servant); Middleton v. Whitridge, 213 N.Y. 499, 108 N.E. 192 (1915) (liability for aggravation of
illness of passenger who rode five hours on defendant's street car in
unconscious condition).
19 Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135, 140 (Del. 1961). This
was an action for wrongful death of an infant who died shortly after
treatment was refused at the emergency ward of the defendant private
hospital. The court affirmed a denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment.
20 See PROSSER,ToaRs 185 (2d ed. 1955).
18

NOTES
ces. 21 A physician is not held to the same prudence of judgment
22

and discretion in an emergency as he is under normal conditions.
Second, he is required only to "possess the skill and learning
which is possessed by the average member of his profession in
good standing in that or similar localities, and to apply that skill
and learning with reasonable care." 2 3 Third, the burden of proof
actions has consistently been placed on the plainin malpractice
24
tiff.

Fourth, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has not been unfair

to physicians, and has in fact been rejected in most malpractice
suits. 25

Fifth, the courts have usually succeeded in placing a

sensible limit on the amount of damages awarded in such actions.26 Sixth, malpractice insurance would seem to provide ade21 RESTATEMENT,

22

23
24

25

26

TORTS § 283 (1934). See In re Estate of Johnson, 145 Neb.

333, 342, 16 N.W.2d 504, 510 (1944), where the court states the rule for
a "reasonable physician" as follows: "A patient is entitled to an ordinarily careful and thorough examination, such as the circumstances,
the condition of the patient, and the physician's opportunities for examination will permit ......
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 296 (1934); accord, Kelly v. Gagnon, 121 Neb.
113, 236 N.W. 160 (1931); PROSSER, TORTS 135, 137-38 (2d ed. 1955).
However, importance is attached to the fact that many activities
require that those engaged in them shall have a natural aptitude or
special training empowering them to cope with dangerous situations
arising in the course of such activities. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 296,
comment c. at 797 (1934).
Ramberg v. Morgan, 209 Iowa 474, 477, 218 N.W. 492, 495 (1928); accord,
Stohlman v. Davis, 117 Neb. 178, 182, 220 N.W. 247, 249 (1928).
See Davis v. Virginian Ry., 361 U. S. 354 (1960); Bruce v. United States,
167 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Cal. 1958); Winters v. Rance, 125 Neb. 577, 251
N.W. 167 (1933); McGuire v. Rix, 118 Neb. 434, 225 N.W. 120 (1929).
Cases rejecting the application of res ipsa loquitur include Quick v.
Thurston, 290 F.2d 360 (D.C. Cir. 1961); McDaniel v. Wolcott, 115 Neb.
675, 214 N.W. 296 (1927); Tady v. Warta, 111 Neb. 521, 196 N.W. 901
(1924).
Cases adopting the doctrine include Dietze v. King, 184 F. Supp. 944
(E.D. Va. 1960); James v. Spear, 170 Cal. App. 2d 17, 338 P.2d 22 (3d
Dist. 1959).
Note, however, that the decision to accept or reject res ipsa loquitur
is based on the individual fact situation before the court, so it cannot
be said that any jurisdiction has per se accepted or rejected the doctrine for malpractice suits.
See, e.g., Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal. 2d 749, 205 P.2d 3 (1949) ($17,500 recovery for improper treatment of leg fractures excessive; new trial
granted); McCrain v. City of New York, 12 App. Div. 2d 482, 207
N.Y.S.2d 685 (1st Dep't 1960) ($115,600 recovery for failure to essay a
myelogram held grossly excessive; plaintiff required to accept $60,000);
Bowles v. Walder, 9 App. Div. 2d 942, 195 N.Y.S.2d 775 (2d Dep't 1959)
($70,000 recovery for elbow injury held excessive; new trial unless
plaintiff accepts $25,000); Mullen v. McLaughlin, 4 App Div. 2d 753, 164
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quate financial protection. 2 7
It would thus appear that physicians or nurses rendering
emergency medical treatment would normally have adequate
common-law protection against unwarranted liability. Furthermore, there is no evidence to indicate that the courts have ignored
these basic protections and permitted excessive recoveries in malpractice actions. There are no reported cases in Nebraska arising
from treatment provided at the scene of an emergency. Nor were
any cases found in other jurisdictions. Although there may have
been some litigation of this nature in the lower state courts, the
absence of appellate opinions is indicative of the paucity of controversy on the subject and casts considerable doubt on the wisdom and discretion of those who refrain from rendering assistance
for fear of liability.

IV.
The statute is susceptible to further objections based on ambiguity and uncertainty. "Emergency" could be defined in numerous ways. One might infer that the term applies only to the
situation where a physician inadvertently comes upon the emer-

27

N.Y.S.2d 612 (2d Dep't 1957) ($36,861 recovery for roentgen dermatitis
held excessive by $9,361).
Among the larger verdicts awarded have been: Shehee v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 122 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. La. 1954) ($64,116 for improper
esophagoscopy necessitating a long series of operations); Gluckstein
v. Lipsett, 93 Cal. App. 2d 391, 209 P.2d 98 (lst Dist. 1949) ($115,000 for
plastic surgery on breasts resulting in disfigurement and humiliation);
Marchese v. Monaco, 52 N.J. Super. 474, 145 A.2d 809 (App. Div. 1958)
($56,000 recovery; mycifradin injections caused deafness).
Malpractice recoveries in Nebraska have involved much smaller
sums. See, e.g., Mangiameli v. Ariano, 126 Neb. 629, 253 N.W. 871 (1934)
($15,000 recovery against dentist for failing to diagnose osteomyelitis
of jaw while extracting a tooth; $7,500 remittitur ordered); Mosslander
v. Armstrong, 90 Neb. 774, 134 N.W. 922 (1912) ($2,000 recovery for
improper treatment of injured foot); Leisenring v. La Croix, 68 Neb.
803, 94 N.W. 1009 (1903) ($1,140 recovery for negligent treatment of
fractured leg).
According to the Physicians', Surgeons' and Dentists' Professional Liability Manual, issued by the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters,
Nebraska physicians may obtain coverage of $100,000 per claim and
$300,000 in the aggregate for a one year period for a premium ranging
from approximately $50 to $200, depending on the services provided by
the physician.
Usual exclusions include: agreements guaranteeing results; services

rendered while under the influence of liquor or drugs; and fraudulent,
criminal or malicious acts.
Malpractice recoveries in excess of $100,000 have been extremely
rare. See cases cited note 26 supra.

NOTES
gency scene. But it might also be applicable when he is called
to the scene; and perhaps even when he is called to a police station to treat a victim.
The same problem arises with the term "emergency care."
This could refer to all medical care rendered in an emergency
situation, or it might be limited to unusual or unforeseen demands
on the physician's skills at such a time. Resolution of this question is, of course, quite basic to the application of the statute.
In addition, the courts may have difficulty in determining if
a physician has acted "gratuitously.1 28 A doctor coming to the
aid of an unconscious accident victim may recover in quasi-contract for the reasonable value of his services. 20 Perhaps he could
refrain from exercising that right and thereby contend that he
acted gratuitously within the meaning of the statute.3 0 A more
troublesome situation would arise if the physician plans to send
the patient a bill, is sued for malpractice before it is mailed, and
then tears up the bill and alleges that he acted gratuitously.3 1
Similar perplexities are occasioned by use of the term "in good
faith. '3 2 One wonders if the line will be drawn at gross negligence-wantonness-wilfulness-or if still another standard will
be devised. An inquiry might be made as to whether an intoxicated individual can provide "good faith" assistance.
To the judiciary falls this troublesome task of discovering
legislative intent in a maze of ambiguous semantics.3 3 In Nebraska the courts often resort to legislative history,3 4 but for this
particular statute it is of little value. The only testimony at the
28

"Gratuitous" is defined as "without valuable or legal consideration"
in BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).

Cotnam v. Wisdom, 83 Ark. 601, 104 S.W. 164 (1907).
30 Tex. Laws c. 317, p. 681 (1961), omits from liability protection that care
rendered for remuneration or with the expectation of remuneration, and
that rendered by a person who was present at the scene soliciting
businesss or seeking to perform a service for remuneration.
31 Under these circumstances, it would be wise for a physician to refrain
from collecting for emergency medical care until after the patient has
made a successful recovery.
32 The meaning of the term varies with the circumstances in which it is
used. Compare Dupuy v. Joly, 197 La. 19, 200 So. 806 (1941), with
Appel v. Morford, 62 Cal. App. 2d 36, 144 P.2d 95 (2d Dist. 1943),
and with Hilton v. Clements, 137 Neb. 791, 291 N.W. 483 (1940).
33 See Ledwith v. Bankers Life Ins. Co., 156 Neb. 107, 54 N.W.2d 409 (1952);
Hansen v. Dakota County, 135 Neb. 582, 283 N.W. 217 (1939).
34 See School Dist. v. Marshall, 160 Neb. 832, 71 N.W.2d 549 (1955); Placek
v. Edstrom, 148 Neb. 79, 26 N.W.2d 489 (1947).
29
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committee hearing was by the senator who introduced the bill,
and by two local physicians. 35 The introducer's statement of purpose was inconclusive. 36 The statement of the committee chairman in advancing the bill to general file was copied almost verbatim from the introducer's statement. Debate on the measure was
minimal and insignificant, and there was only one disssenting vote
on final passage.
Perhaps a liberal judicial interpretation of the language in
this statute could withstand objections of vagueness and uncerof the
tainty. On the other hand, it is a statute in derogation
37
common law, and as such should be strictly construed.
V.
Tort liability is based primarily on an analysis of social policy
with its underlying risk-bearing and loss-distributing factors. In
most areas of the law, the movement has been toward extending
liability. 38 This, in contrast, is a "no liability" statute. Should
not the courts consider who is better able to bear the risk and distribute the loss-the innocent injured party (who might be permanently disabled), or the negligent physician, surgeon, or nurse?
Legislators and the courts should give due consideration to the
precedent being established by these statutes. It has taken many
years to dent the doctrine of charitable immunities. Are we now
willing to embark upon an era of "Good Samaritan immunities"?
Clayton Yeutter, '63

35

Hearing Before the Committee on Public Health & Miscellaneous Sub-

36

jects, Nebraska Legislature, 72d Sess. (March 16, 1961).
It states: "This bill provides to relieve the responsibility of physicians
and surgeons [later amended to add nurses] who render emergency
care at the scene of an accident or such like event .

. . ."

However, a

few lines later the following statement is made: "The bill is not designated to alleviate any responsibility . . . ." Just what may be deduced
from this is purely conjectural.
37

See Davis v. Walker, 170 Neb. 891, 908, 104 N.W.2d 479, 489 (1960).
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 221' La. 919, 60
So. 2d 873 (1952); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111

38 See, e.g., Le Blanc v. Louisiana

N.E. 1050 (1916); Colton v. Foulkes, 259 Wis. 142, 47 N.W.2d 901 (1951);

and the various Workmen's Compensation statutes.

